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We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting
mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide
how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is ¯nally
provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all
contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a
fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and
both to the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under
unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall e±ciency are mixed. When
provision occurs, only unanimity enhances e±ciency. Overall, however,
unanimity leads to too many rejections. (JEL: C 72, C 91, H 41)
1 Introduction
Public goods are a central and extensively researched problem in economics. There
is an enormous amount of theoretical and experimental literature. Much of the the-
oretical literature tries to ¯nd a mechanism in order to solve the free-rider problem
(e.g., via an optimal tax mechanism as in Groves and Ledyard [1977]). Experi-
mental research on public goods centers around the voluntary contribution mecha-
nism (VCM). Experimental behavior of the majority of players di®ers substantially
from the individually rational solution. Several studies on simple linear public good
games demonstrate that only a minority of subjects free-ride, while the overwhelm-
ing majority behave as conditional cooperators (e.g., Fischbacher, GÄ achter,
and Fehr [2001]). Conditional cooperators increase their own contribution as the
contributions of others increase.
By cooperating in providing a public good, agents can jointly increase their in-
dividual payo®s. However, cooperation always entails a risk of exploitation. If one
could condition one's own contribution on that of others, this, of course, could be
avoided. Yet, how do we deal with the risk that cooperation will be exploited?
Are there mechanisms which diminish this risk? The economic literature o®ers
several approaches: sequential contribution announcements (e.g., Moxnes and
¤The authors would like to thank the participants and the discussants at the Bad
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1Van der Heijden [2003], Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund [2005]), re-
grouping of players according to their previous contributions (e.g., Ehrhart and
Keser [1999], Page, Putterman, and Unel [2005]), intergenerational advising
among players (e.g., Chaudhuri, Graziano, and Maitra [2006]) or ex post
punishment/reward mechanisms, which allow participants to de-/increase others'
payo®s at their own cost (e.g., Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner [1992], Fehr
and GÄ achter [2000]). The results of the sequential contribution announcements
indicate a high correlation between contributions of leaders (players who announce
their contributions ¯rst) and followers,1 while advising, regrouping and punishment
mechanisms increase contributions quite substantially.
Our study follows a di®erent approach. We combine a linear public good game
with a subsequent voting stage. After all, in every democracy most public goods
are decided upon via referendums. Ledyard and Palfrey [2002] give a theo-
retical justi¯cation for the ubiquitous use of referendums. They prove that under
certain conditions the performance of an interim e±cient2 public good mechanism
can be approximated by referendums. A broad empirical literature has examined the
various aspects of referendums for the allocation of public resources (e.g., Romer,
Rosenthal, and Munley [1992]). While in most cases referendums are held with
a limited number of elected representatives, special interest has been directed to-
wards the cases in which referendums are held with the entire electorate (on the level
of municipalities as the most prominent example in Switzerland, see Frey [1994]).
Indeed, empirical studies provide evidence that public good provision is more ef-
¯cient in direct democracies (e.g., Pommerehne [1978], Feld and Matsusaka
[2003]).
There are several ways referendums can be implemented in public good game
experiments. Generally, one can distinguish between ex ante, ex interim, and ex post
voting mechanisms. Ex post voting mechanisms allow participants to decide upon
the structure of the public good game in the consecutive period, for example, by
voting to ostracize a particular player (e.g., Masclet et al. [2003], Cinyabuguma,
Page, and Putterman [2005]).3 Ex ante voting refers to mechanisms which, e.g.
allow group members to decide about the introduction of a fee mechanism before
they determine their contributions (e.g., Feld and Tyran [2002]). This article,
however, concentrates on ex interim voting. Here, players decide on the provision of
a public good after they have contributed. If the voting mechanism rejects provision,
contributions are reimbursed. Based on the particular decision rule, the ex interim
mechanism allows us to manipulate the risk of exploitation.
So far there has been little research on ex interim voting in public good provi-
sion. The authors of this study are only aware of the paper by Banks, Plott, and
Porter [1988]. They (among others) compare the performance of a VCM with a
1Of course, here the exploitation problem for leaders remains unsolved.
2For a de¯nition of interim e±ciency in public goods, see Ledyard and Palfrey
[1999].
3For a theoretical model applying ostracism, see Hirshleifer and Rasmusen [1989].
2VCM with posterior unanimity voting. Subjects either play a public good game
by only deciding how much to contribute, or by ¯rst deciding upon their contribu-
tion before voting on whether, with the given and known contributions, the public
good should actually be provided. Only if all vote for the installation is the public
good ¯nally paid to the players. The experiments ¯nd that, while contributions in
the referendum treatment are higher, over all e±ciency decreases as the unanimity
mechanism leads to many rejections. Although there are cases in the real world with
an unanimity voting rule, the most prominent case is that of majority voting. This
is why, in this paper we compare the e±ciency of a majority to that of a unanimity
referendum.
In a very stylized form this is related to a recent discussion concerning the modus
operandi of the European Union. Since it's enlargement to 25 member states, there
is an intensive discussion as how to change the rules for decision ¯nding in order
to cope with the increased number of members (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier [2002]). In the past many decisions could only be made unanimously.
Since it's enlargement from 16 to 25 members, it is now argued that the EU will be
unable to make decisions on important issues. It is thus argued that the majority
rule should be applied to several topics and problems. An important question albeit
one that is often ignored in this context is which method leads to better decisions.
Obviously, a union of nations is a much more complicated thing than a simple
public good game. However, in a very stylized way, the purpose of a union is to
jointly create a public good. States coordinate in order to create a common market,
a monetary union or else because they at least think that this bene¯ts all of them.
But how do they contribute to this common good? Besides monetary payments,
member states pay by political e®ort, by giving up sovereignty and by allowing
economic powers to be shifted.
Another very recent example is the e®ort by members of the United Nations to
create a military force in order to supervise the truce in the Democratic Republic
of the Kongo during the coming elections. In this case, member states ¯rst name
the size of their contingent before voting unanimously on whether this is su±cient
to actually justify engaging in that war torn region.
In this study we introduce a standard model for a public good game with volun-
tary contribution levels but ex interim voting in which these is complete information
on whether the public good is actually being provided. We compare unanimity and
majority voting to a baseline treatment with automatic provision. If the provision
of the good is rejected, contributions are reimbursed, yet a small fee is extracted as a
transaction fee. We test our model of public good provision in a series of laboratory
experiments where subjects repeatedly play our game for a ¯nite number of periods.
Although there are many aspects which may a®ect the e±ciency of the two voting
mechanisms in this context, we, for now, abstain from introducing more than our
single treatment, the voting mechanism.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the model. Further-
more, we elaborate hypotheses for players' behavior and discuss counter-arguments.
3Section 3 reports the experimental design, section 4 the results of the laboratory
experiments, and section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the ¯ndings.
2 Public Good Game with Ex Interim Voting
In the following we introduce our public goods model. By and large we reduce
the public goods problem to what we view as its most important aspects. More
speci¯cally, for example, we neither introduce di®erent contribution costs nor non
constant (decreasing) marginal productivity of the public good (e.g., as in Smith
[1980]). We rather rely on the most simple model as, for example, analyzed by
Isaac, McCue, and Plott [1985]. We also keep the voting stage as simple as
possible by using equal voting weights.
2.1 The Game
We de¯ne a simple n-person linear public good game. More speci¯cally, there are
n ¸ 2 players, each of whom can contribute to a linear public good. Each player
i receives an initial endowment of ei > 0. We denote player i's contribution to
the public good by gi (0 · gi · ei) and the sum of contributions of all players
by G. Further, the marginal rate of per capita return of the public good, denoted
as ® (1=n < ® < 1), is identical for all players. After each player determines his
contribution, she is informed about the contributions by others and decides on her
vote4 'i such that
(1) 'i =
(
1 if player i votes for the public good,
0 otherwise.
Whether the public good is provided after the vote depends on the voting mech-
anism. The voting operator © is de¯ned as a function of the set of all votes
' = f'1;'2;:::;'ng as
(2) ©(') =
(
1 if the public good is provided,
0 otherwise.
We introduce a fee f, which has to be paid by those who promised a positive
contribution if the public good is not provided. Thus, in con°ict only those who
wished to contribute have to pay it. One could think of this fee as transaction
or opportunity costs, for example, in the sense of lost interest. Alternatively, fee
f represents the costs of con°ict that only concern those who intended to create
a public good (gi > 0) in the ¯rst place. More speci¯cally, if the public good is
4Of course, one may argue that only those players should be allowed to vote who
contributed. However, players perhaps do not want the good to be provided, so they do
not contribute and, furthermore, veto the provision.
4rejected, all players who contributed have to pay the same fee, which, however,
never exceeds their contribution (f · gi 8 i); that is, f equals the smallest possible
positive contribution, f = min
k
fgkj0 < gk · ekg. Of course, the fee is common
knowledge at the beginning of the game.
Therefore, de¯ning ±i = sign(gi), player i's payo® equals
(3) ¼i = ei + ©(®G ¡ gi) ¡ (1 ¡ ©)±if:
We compare two voting mechanisms: unanimity voting versus majority voting.





i=0 'i = n;
0 otherwise,





i=1 'i > n
2;
0 otherwise.
Our equilibrium analysis concentrates on subgame perfectness. Clearly the vot-
ing stage has multiple equilibria. For example, assume that endowments are sym-
metric and everybody fully contributes. Under unanimity, as everybody pro¯ts from
provision, acceptance by all then constitutes a strict equilibrium. However, also re-
jection by two or more constitutes a voting equilibrium, this time, however, only
in weakly dominated strategies. There are, however, good reasons to exclude these
equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. As long as the game, as in our exper-
iment, is not played in an environment with an in¯nite horizon the most obvious
ones are the weak incentives and the inherent coordination problems.
We implicitly exclude these equilibria in weakly dominated strategies by assum-
ing that subjects vote \sincerely". That is, we assume that subjects always vote for
(against) provision if they earn more (or less) if the public good is provided than
if it is not. We, furthermore, assume that subjects vote for provision if indi®erent.
Subsequently and due to fee f, provision in the remaining subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the game is not di®erent from that of the standard game (for a proof, see
Appendix).
Proposition 1 Assuming \sincere" voting behavior, equilibrium provision of all
agents equals zero, independent of the voting mechanism.
Note that, (independently of our \sincere" voting assumption) without fee f, our
game would allow for equilibria with di®erent contribution pro¯les. Here, two or
more maximum contributers with equal contributions were indi®erent between pro-
vision and reimbursement.
52.2 Hypotheses
There exists overwhelming evidence from both one-shot and repeated experiments of
the public goods games that the subgame perfect equilibrium rather poorly describes
the behavior. Therefore, it seems plausible that we cannot verify Proposition 1
by experimental data. Rather, we have to consider positive contributions even in
the ¯nitely repeated game. The voting mechanism subsequent to the contribution
decision can be see as a safeguard against others' free-riding. Apparently, under
unanimity there is no risk of exploitation by (partial) free riders since a single veto
su±ces to avoid provision.
Under majority voting, the safeguard e®ect is lower than under unanimity. There
is a potential exploitation of a minority. Consequently, one might expect that con-
tributions would tend to be lower under majority voting than under unanimity.
Nonetheless, contributions under majority voting are higher than in a public good
game without any voting mechanism.
This conclusion can also be drawn by allowing for imperfect expectations in
combination with reasoning of a limited depth. In saying that reasoning is of a
limited depth we mean that subjects only adjust their own contribution by playing
best reply with respect to their imperfect expectations. Given the same initial
expectations5 concerning the set of contributions by all the participants expect for
oneself, the contribution of the highest contributer { who must be held indi®erent
according to one's own best reply function { is under the majority mechanism,
at most as high as under unanimity. Consequently, one's own best reply under
unanimity must be at least as high as under majority voting.6 If there is no voting
mechanism at all, the free riding incentive is much higher, as it is dominant to always
contribute nothing. We summarize these regularities in the following behavioral
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Under the unanimity voting mechanism, contributions are not smaller
than under the majority rule, where, in turn contributions are not smaller than in
the same public good game in which there is automatic provision but no voting mech-
anism.
Considering the observations already made by Banks, Plott, and Porter [1988],
we expect that for the same contribution behavior, unanimity voting is more likely
than majority voting to end in rejection of provision. Consequently, an increased
risk of exploitation is accompanied by an increase in the acceptance of exploitation
as well.
Hypothesis 2 For the same contribution behavior, provision occurs more often
under majority voting than under unanimity.
5Behaviorally one can think of the initial expectations as a subjective idea about what
each subject would see as an `ideal' contribution.
6See equations (A4) and (A7) in the appendix.
6Of course, the question now arises as to which mechanism is more e±cient in the
sense of the ¯nal overall size of the public good. Given the two previous hypotheses,
it is hardly possible to make a statement concerning the overall e®ect. However,
given the instability of minimum agreeing coalitions, coordination under majority
voting is much more di±cult, suggesting:
Hypothesis 3 Overall e±ciency is higher under unanimity than under majority
voting.
3 Experimental Design
As already mentioned, there are several aspects in a public good game with ex
interim voting which may a®ect behavior and thus the e±ciency of the voluntary
public good provision. Besides the voting mechanism itself, the number of subjects,
the possibility of communication (or the number of possible coordination stages), as
well as asymmetries in endowments, the costs of provision, the marginal productivity
of the good or voting weights, may in°uence the overall outcome. For now, we ignore
such aspects and compare behavior with the following very simple design.
Our only treatment variable is the voting rule whose three conditions { unanimity
(UN), majority (MA) and no referendum, that is, automatic provision (NO) { are
compared between subjects. Thus, each subject only plays one of the three treatment
conditions. The reason for this choice is straight forward. Public good games are
known for their restart e®ects. Thus, comparing three treatment conditions within
subjects would require that all six possible sequences be tested.
As in many other public good experiments, subjects repeat the game they play
ten times with the same group members before being matched to new groups using
a perfect-stranger design and playing again 10 rounds.
Subjects were ¯rst handed general instructions describing in detail a public good
game without any referendum. Then they had to answer a control questionnaire,
which was designed to make subjects more acquainted with the game. Subjects
who could not answer the questionnaire correctly were excluded from the remaining
experiment. Only then were subjects given instructions describing the entire game,
including the voting stages. Except for one small paragraph, these instructions were
identical for all three treatment conditions. All instructions were read aloud.7
In the computerized experiment itself, in each period players ¯rst chose their
intended contribution to the public good. Thereafter they were informed about the
contributions of each other group member and about each subject's payo®, once
in case of the provision of the public good and once in case the contributions are
reimbursed.8 Then they were asked to vote for or against the provision of the
7For a translation of the instructions, see Appendix B. Questionnaires, and experimental
data are provided by the authors on request.
8Also in the NO treatment condition, subjects were informed about these two possible
outcomes with a note stressing that reimbursement is only a hypothetical option.
7public good. Finally players were informed about the results of the voting stage and
their resulting earnings in that period. Hereby subjects were able to identify both,
(intended) contributions and voting behavior of each group member.
In detail, our groups consisted of n = 5 subjects, who each could at most invest
their entire endowment of e = 20. Only integer contributions were allowed. The
marginal per capita return of the public good was ® = 0:4 since this value is often
found in the experimental literature about public goods and o®ers us the oppor-
tunity to compare our results with previous studies. Finally, the fee equalled the
smallest possible positive contribution, that is f = 1. Total experimental payo®s
were accumulated over periods. The only di®erence between the three treatment
conditions was the rule applied to the manifested votes. Note that in the NO condi-
tion subjects also submitted a vote which was communicated to all group members,
but had no e®ect on the ¯nal outcome. It is, however, of utmost importance also to
let subjects vote and to make these votes public, as otherwise it would be impossible
to compare NO with UN and MA.
4 Experimental Results
In total, 4 sessions for each of the three treatment conditions with 25 subjects
each were conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of
Economics in Jena. Subjects were students of various ¯elds recruited from Friedrich
Schiller University Jena, of which about 38% had never participated in an experiment
at the experimental laboratory in Jena before. Experiments were computerized
using z-Tree software (Fischbacher [1999]), and recruitment was organized by the
software package ORSEE (Greiner [2004]). No subject participated in more than
one session; average earnings were 9.11 Euro (with a standard deviation of 1.36);
and sessions lasted approximately 75 minutes (including admission and payment).
For the ¯rst ten periods (\subsession 1") we have 20 independent group obser-
vations for each treatment condition. After the restart (period 11 to 20, \subsession
2") strict statistical analysis would require taking an entire session as one inde-
pendent matching group observation. That would leave us with four observations
per treatment condition. However, in the following analysis, we will neglect the
possibility that dependence resulting from interaction in subsession 1 carries over
to a dependency of not interacting subjects in subsession 2. Thus, we assume for
subsession 2 that each (newly matched) group constitutes an independent matching
group.
4.1 Contributions
First we analyze the average contributions to the public good, which are plotted
separately for each treatment condition over the course of the experiment in Figure
1. In the ¯rst period, average contributions are almost the same in all conditions.
Average contributions in the UN condition, however, are the highest throughout.
8This observation is supported by a Wilcoxon signed rank test,9 which ¯nds that
except for periods 1, 2 and 11, contributions under UN are signi¯cantly (® < 5%)10
higher than under MA. The same holds when one compares UN with NO. The only
exception is that NO and UN, furthermore, do not di®er signi¯cantly in period 15.
Although average contributions in the NO condition are higher than in the MA
condition in almost every round, the existing di®erences are not signi¯cant.11 De-
spite the wrong sign in the relation between NO and MA, we can thus not reject
our behavioral Hypothesis 1.
Observation 1 In the unanimity (UN) referendum treatment condition, contri-
butions are signi¯cantly higher than in both MA and NO. There is no signi¯cant
di®erence in contributions between conditions MA and NO.






































Figure 1: Average contributions over repetitions and treatments
For a more detailed analysis, we grouped individual contributions into classes of
gi = 0, 6 > gi > 0, 11 > gi > 5, 16 > gi > 10, and gi > 15. The most noteworthy
observation this allows is that the frequency of very high contributions (gi > 15)
in the UN mechanism remains unchanged throughout the experiment. Moreover,
with respect to contributions, we can hardly identify an end game e®ect under the
UN condition. In the other two treatment conditions, one can see that the most
important source for a decrease in average contributions is the enormous increase
in free riders (gi = 0). While the frequency of intermediate contributions hardly
change, the frequency of very high contributions decreases greatly.
9For the Wilcoxon signed rank test, only group averages are taken, thus assuming 20
independent observations.
10If not mentioned otherwise, signi¯cance levels are set to ® < 5% throughout.
11Note that except for period 19, the median contribution under NO is also higher than
under the MA condition.
94.2 Voting Results
Figure 2 shows the average rate of yes votes over the course of the experiments. The
graph shows that the rate of yes votes is almost identical for conditions MA and
UN. Condition NO, however, has on average a smaller rate of yes votes throughout
the experiment, with the di®erence becoming larger over the course of the session.
This observation is quali¯ed by a Wilcoxon signed rank test.12 The former ¯nds
that there are no signi¯cant di®erences between the rate of yes votes in MA and UN
in every round. However, in the ¯rst subsession, average yes rates under NO are
signi¯cantly smaller than under MA (UN) in 6 (4) of the 10 periods. The frequency
of signi¯cantly smaller yes rates under NO increases after the restart, with 9 (8) if
compared to MA (UN) in subsession 2.
Observation 2 The rate of yes votes are identical in conditions UN and MA. Only
if voting is merely cheap talk (condition NO) do subjects vote signi¯cantly less often
for the provision.





















































Figure 2: Average voting behavior
The same plot also shows the frequency of the outcome of the referendum for MA
and UN. Although the rates of yes votes in conditions MA and UN di®er only
insigni¯cantly, under MA the public good is provided signi¯cantly more often than
under UN in every round.13
However, in order to test our Hypothesis 2 we need to control for contribution
behavior. Table 1 reports the results of two di®erent logit regressions on the outcome
of the voting stages per matching group and period ©m;t. More speci¯cally the two
logit estimations only use data from the UN and MA sessions, and the following
12Again, the test is based on group averages as independent observations.
13Â2 test of homogeneity.
10mean function is assumed
(6) logit
¡1(Prob(©m;t = 1)) = x
0
m;1¯ + &m;
where Prob(©m;t = 1) stands for the latent probability that voting at period t in
matching group m results in provision, xm for the matrix of regressors, ¯ for the
vector of (true) coe±cients and &m for an unobserved random group e®ect (The usual
assumptions concerning the random e®ects apply). In the ¯rst model (denoted as i)
in Table 1, contribution behavior is controlled for by the inclusion of the sum (G),
variance (var), minimum (min) and maximum (max) of all contributions in group m
at period t. Most importantly, the regression result on the treatment dummy DUN
indicates:
Observation 3 Given the same contribution behavior, unanimity voting (UN) is
signi¯cantly less likely to end in provision than majority voting (MA).
While the increase in the log likelihood is substantial, the relatively high standard
deviation of the random e®ect indicates substantial heterogeneity between groups.14
However, there are more signi¯cant di®erences between treatment conditions
which show up in the model ii of Table 1 (Best model according to the Akaike
criterion and the Schwartz criterion). In contrast to model i, model ii does not
include the minimum contribution. However, in addition, it includes two interaction
e®ects with the treatment dummy (DUNG and DUNmax). First observe that while
in MA the likelihood of provision is largely invariant to the sum of contributions
G, it is signi¯cantly increasing in G under UN.15 Finally, whereas under MA overall
acceptance is signi¯cantly increasing in the maximum contribution it is { albeit
weakly { signi¯cantly16 decreasing in max under UN.
These results illustrate the most important di®erence between the two voting
mechanisms. Under MA voting, the maximum group contribution only increases the
number of other players for whom provision is pro¯table and thus the likelihood that
the maximum contributer will be exploited. Under unanimity, this is reversed since
an increase in the maximum contribution increases the chance that the maximum
contributer will prefer reimbursement and thus vetoes.
4.3 Voting Behavior
For a more elaborate analysis of the voting stage, we turn to the random e®ect logit
estimation of individual voting behavior 'i;t, listed in Table 2. Here the dependent
14Due to the between subjects design no ¯xed e®ects estimation of the combined data
is possible. To test whether random e®ects are applicable, separate ¯xed and random
e®ects estimations for MA and UN data were compared in Hausman tests. The null of no
di®erences can not be rejected in both cases (UN: p = 0:073, MA: p = 0:095), allowing us
to assume strict exogeneity of the unobserved e®ects.
15The combination G + DUNG remains signi¯cant (p < 0:001).
16With ¡0:275 the combined coe±cient max+DUNmax is signi¯cant (p = 0:018).
11Table 1
Random E®ect Logit of Voting Outcomes ©m;t (MA and UN)
i ii
constant 2:961¤¤(0:69) 1:421 (0:76)
DUN ¡8:273¤¤(0:92) ¡4:989¤¤(1:38)
Gm;t 0:078¤¤(0:02) ¡0:042 (0:04)
DUNGm;t 0:190¤¤(0:05)
var(gm;t) ¡0:022 (0:02) ¡0:031¤¤(0:01)
min(gm;t) 0:158 (0:10)
max(gm;t) ¡0:005 (0:09) 0:505¤¤(0:16)
DUNmax(gm;t) ¡0:780¤¤(0:18)
logL ¡182 ¡172
¾&m (¾resid.) 1:819 (0:502) 2:015 (0:552)
Note: ¤: p < 5%, ¤¤: p < 1%. logL of null model: ¡497.
Standard errors in parentheses.
'i;t equals one if subject i voted for provision in period t and is zero otherwise. The
underlying assumptions are similar to those in the model of equation (6). This time,
however, the data is on the individual level, implying that the unobserved random
e®ect is also based on each subject (&i),17 and the data of treatment condition NO is
included in the analysis. In Table 2 gi;t stands for subject i's intended contribution to
the public good at period t; variable Gm(i);t is the sum of contributions in matching
group m (where i is a member) at t; var(g¡i;t) is the variance of all contributions
in group m at t by members other than i; and Dmax is a dummy indicating that i
is the maximum contributer in his matching group.18 Variable Dyes>no is a dummy
indicating that, given the monetary incentives, the subject should prefer provision.
Again, DUN (DNO) indicates the treatment dummy for treatment UN (NO). In
order to test for e®ects of inequality aversion, we included variables indicating how














¯ if Gm(i);t > 0 and si;t = 0 otherwise:
Further, we set dummy Dgi>g to indicate that gi;t is greater than the average con-
tribution Gm(i);t=n. We can now measure inequality towards one's [dis]advantage
by [s
+
i;t = Dgi>gsi;t] s
¡
i;t = (1 ¡ Dgi>g)si;t. Finally, we control for repetition e®ects
via dummy Drestart, indicating periods 11 to 20 and ¿m, indicating which repetition
matching group m is playing (¿m 2 f1;:::;10g). Multiplicative combinations of
17The inclusion of a matching group e®ect outside the subject e®ect proved to be un-
necessary (LR-test: p-value = 0.213).
18Note that the similarly de¯ned variable Dmin was also tested, but proved to be in-
signi¯cant.
12Table 2
Random E®ect Logit of Individual Voting Behavior 'i;t
constant 0:498 (0.54) DUN 0:669 (0.71) DNO ¡1:060¤ (0.45)
gi;t ¡0:421¤¤ (0.05) DUNgi;t 0:164¤ (0.08) DNOgi;t 0:214¤¤(0.06)
Gm(i);t 0:148¤¤ (0.01) DUNGm(i);t ¡0:058¤¤(0.02) DNOGm(i);t ¡0:060¤¤(0.02)
s
+







i;t 3:220 (1.84) DUNs
¡
i;t ¡1:862 (4.00) DNOs
¡
i;t ¡5:700¤ (2.33)
var(g¡i;t) ¡0:015¤¤(0.002) Dmax ¡0:714¤¤(0.17) Dyes>no 2:542¤¤(0.37)
Drestart ¡0:818¤¤ (0.23) ¿m ¡0:157¤¤(0.03) Drestart¿m 0:082¤ (0.03)
logL = ¡1570 (Null model: logL = ¡3163) ¾&i = 1:123, ¾resid. = 0:12345
Note: ¤: p < 5%, ¤¤: p < 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation of variance covariance
matrix via 50 bootstraps. Interaction e®ects not included are neither signi¯cant nor contribute to
the accuracy of the estimation.
variables indicate interaction e®ects. Note that interaction e®ects not included in
Table 2 are not signi¯cant; nor do they contribute to the accuracy of the estimation.
Looking ¯rst at the constant and the treatment dummies, one can see that there
is no signi¯cant di®erence in the overall tendency to vote for provision between MA
and UN. However, if voting becomes cheap talk (NO), the general tendency to vote
for provision is signi¯cantly smaller than in MA and UN. Turning to reactions to
contribution behavior, note that although the size of the coe±cients di®er signi¯-
cantly between treatments, the signs of the total e®ects on gi;t and Gm(i);t remain
signi¯cantly (p-value < 0:001) the same in all treatments. So, in all treatments,
one's own contribution signi¯cantly decreases the tendency for yes votes while the
sum of contributions signi¯cantly increases the tendency for yes votes. However, in
treatments UN and NO, these reactions are signi¯cantly smaller than in treatment
MA.
Not surprisingly, there are less yes votes with increasing heterogeneity in group
contributions (var(gm;t)) and if someone is the maximum contributer (Dmax). Fur-
thermore, if provision is optimal, subjects are more likely to vote for it.
As we could observe above, cooperativeness, as signaled by intended contribu-
tions decreases with the number of repetitions within one matching group. The
same can be observed concerning the yes votes (¿m). There is a similar negative
shift after the restart (Drestart). This shift is only mildly compensated for by a slight
decrease in the reactivity to the number of repetitions (Drestart¿m). Still, the overall
reaction to the number of repetitions (¿m+Drestart¿m) remains signi¯cantly negative
(p-value = 0.004).
Observation 4 The general tendency to vote for provision decreases with the num-
ber of repetitions. Directly after the restart, it increases again, albeit to a lower level
than in the very ¯rst round.
Concerning inequality, there are again interesting di®erences. In the MA treatment,
13yes votes hardly react to inequality in contributions. Under unanimity, this changes
tremendously. The more that someone contributed more than others and thus, the
more unequal the payo®s are { to his disadvantage { the more likely someone will veto




i;t = ¡8:873 signi¯cant at p-value = 0.003).
On the other hand, inequality that is to one's advantage has no in°uence on voting
behavior. Despite signi¯cant di®erences towards other treatments, qualitatively the
same holds for the NO condition: Inequality that is to one's disadvantage results in
signi¯cantly less yes votes (p-value < 0:001). Although, in condition NO, the overall





¡2:475, this remains insigni¯cant (p-value = 0.088).
Observation 5 Inequality only signi¯cantly a®ects the acceptance of provision in
treatments UN and NO, and here, only if it is to the decider's disadvantage. The
highest e®ects can be observed if voting is merely cheap talk (NO).
In the theoretical analysis, we excluded certain voting equilibria in weakly dominated
strategies by assuming \sincere" voting. Looking at actual voting behavior, this
assumption appears reasonable. Over all periods, 88.3% and 89.5% voted \sincerely"
in the two relevant voting conditions, MA and UN. The smallest frequency, of only
73.9%, can be observed in treatment NO. Opposed to any strategic argument in favor
of these equilibria, the frequency of \sincere" votes is highest in the ¯rst periods of
a subsession (98% in MA and UN).
4.4 E±ciency
So, which referendum design yields more e±cient outcomes? There are several
answers to Hypothesis 3. If we refer to cases in which the public good is provided,
pro¯ts under unanimity voting are signi¯cantly higher than in any other voting
mechanism, whereas under MA and NO they only di®er insigni¯cantly. Figure 3
plots in the ¯rst panel average pro¯ts for those cases where the public good is
provided.
Observation 6 If the public good is ¯nally provided, the majority voting mech-
anism (MA) yields no higher pro¯ts than automatic provision (NO). Under una-
nimity voting (UN), however, pro¯ts are signi¯cantly higher than with any other
mechanism.
However, if we refer to the average overall pro¯ts, we ¯nd the opposite result. The
second panel in Figure 3 plots the average pro¯ts of subjects separately for each
treatment condition. Observe that almost throughout the experiment, it holds that
NO is more e±cient than MA, which in turn yields higher pro¯ts than UN.
Surprisingly, however, most of these di®erences are not signi¯cant. This is largely
due to a very high variance of average group pro¯ts, especially under UN in early
rounds. Consequently only di®erences in later rounds of a subsession between NO




































































Figure 3: Average pro¯ts
15and UN, on the one hand, and MA and UN, on the other hand, become signi¯cant.
There are no signi¯cant di®erences between NO and MA.
Observation 7 Majority voting (MA) does not yield signi¯cantly di®erent pro¯ts
when there is automatic provision (NO). On average, unanimity voting (UN) yields
smaller pro¯ts than either MA or NO.
5 Discussion
This study experimentally explored e®ects of ex interim referendums on the volun-
tary provision of public goods. Particularly, we have tested whether an unanimity
or majority ex interim referendum enhances voluntary contributions and overall ef-
¯ciency in a public good game. As a baseline treatment, we introduced a cheap
talk referendum where subjects could only communicate their satisfaction with the
intended contributions, without a®ecting outcomes.
Theoretically, assuming \sincere" voting, all games have a zero contribution sub-
game perfect equilibrium. Behaviorally there are, however, important di®erences.
Cooperative players in the game with automatic provision risk exploitation. This
risk is already reduced if provision must be accepted by a majority and unanimity
voting eliminates this risk completely. Due to this \safeguard e®ect", we expected
the highest contributions for unanimity voting and the smallest for automatic pro-
vision.
As in most public good experiments, we observed substantial contributions in
all treatment conditions. Throughout the experiment, contributions were highest
under unanimity voting. Furthermore, intended contributions in the unanimity
mechanism remained very high even in very late periods of each subsession. A
decline in cooperation in the unanimity condition could only be observed if there
was a decline in acceptance of provision. Overall, the high rates of rejection in the
unanimity mechanism rendered it less e±cient than the other conditions. Hereby
it is not individual voting behavior but primarily the mechanism which drives this
result. Individual voting behavior only di®ers substantially if votes are merely a
communication device (NO).
Interestingly, majority voting { if compared to the baseline condition { hardly
di®ers in contributions and outcomes. To some extent, this result may be driven by
the chosen productivity of the public good. Given identical contribution patterns,
the number of subjects preferring provision is a®ected by the productivity of the
good. Further research is needed in order to ¯nd a ¯nal answer to the question
whether majority voting yields di®erent results in public good provision conditions
in which players can communicate their satisfaction with the intended contributions.
For economic policy these results have very speci¯c implications. If the priority
lies on the quality of an agreement, unanimity voting clearly is the mechanism of
choice. More importantly, under repeated interaction, unanimity is better able to
keep intended contributions on a high level. So, if there are other instruments
16available that can e±ciently broker agreements, unanimity should be able to yield
the best results in the long run. However, if this is not the case, a simple or quali¯ed
majority mechanism may be better. In a repeated interaction environment this
entails the risk that some partners will become very uncooperative, and thus the
unity of the group might be threatened.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Let us assume that players always vote for (or against) the public good if they earn
more (or less) when the public good is provided than if it is not. Obviously, since
one's payo® increases with the size of the public good but decreases with one's own
contribution, group members who did not contribute vote for the provision of the
public good for any G ¸ 0. However, for players who contributed to the public good
(±i = 1), a simple calculation of payo®s yields that they vote for the provision if
(A1) gi · ®G + f:
Given the ordered set of contributions in a decreasing sequence g = fg1;g2;:::;gng
with gi ¸ gi+1, we ¯nd the following:
Lemma 1
'i = 1 ) 'i+1 = 1;
'i+1 = 0 ) 'i = 0:
(A2)
A.1 Unanimity
Using Lemma 1, we derive directly
Proposition 2 Under unanimity voting, the public good is provided if the player
who contributed the most prefers provision, which is the case for g1 · ®G + f.
We can now reduce the two stage game to a one stage game by replacing the last
stage with it's solution outcome. The resulting reduced strategic form game has a
modi¯ed payo® function: Subject i's payo® is de¯ned as in equation (3). The only
di®erence is that now © is de¯ned as a function of g1, G and f as follows:
(A3) ©(') =
(
1 if g1 · ®G + f;
0 otherwise.
One can consider the reduced game as a coordination game between the player
with the highest contribution and all other players who, with their contributions,
keep the rejection by the former player unpro¯table. In the following, by g¡i and
G¡i we de¯ne the set and sum, respectively, of contributions by players other than
17i. That is, g¡i = g n fgig and G¡i =
P
j6=i gj. Furthermore, m de¯nes the player
with the maximum contribution in g¡i and gm
















Given the set of contributions by other players g¡i, we can derive player i's
best response g¤
i such that her contribution holds m indi®erent about voting for or

















The ¯rst equation in (A4) guarantees that m is indi®erent, whereas the ¯rst condi-
tion in the same line guarantees that this is still possible and pro¯table for i. For
the relation between g¤
i and gm
¡i, we ¯nd the following:
Proposition 3 For every gm
¡i > 0 and g¤
i > 0, it follows that g¤
i < gm
¡i.





















from (A4) for g¤







This relation can now be reinserted into (A4), yielding g¤
i · gm
¡i ¡ f and thus
g¤
i < gm
¡i 8f > 0: Q.E.D.
Let us now take again any ordered set g+ with at least some positive contributions,
i.e. g
+
1 > 0 and G+ > 0. From Proposition 3 we can conclude that the best response




2 , is to contribute a g¤
1, for
which it holds that g¤
1 < g
+
2 , and thus g¤
1 < g
+
1 . Consequently, for the reduced game
there is no ¯x point according to the best replies for any G > 0. The only ¯x point
exists for G = 0, which proves Proposition 1 for the game with unanimity voting.
18A.2 Majority
Applying Lemma 1 we can show that a simple variation of Proposition 2 holds for the
public good game with majority voting. Yet, there are smaller majority coalitions.
Let us consider once again the ordered set of contributions g¡i for all players other
than i. We de¯ne l as that subject in the ordered set g¡i for whom it holds that
(A6) n ¡ l + 1 > l ¡ 1 and n ¡ l · l:
By Lemma 1 we know that if player l prefers provision, all players with lower
contributions (l+1;:::;n¡1) do as well. Thus the coalition of players fl;l+1;:::;n¡
1g from g¡i, together with a best replying i, constitute a minimum winning coalition,
preferring provision. We can thus form a reduced game by again replacing the voting
stage with it's solution outcome, which is provision if gl · ®G+f and no provision

















¡i de¯nes the contribution of player l, and G
¡l
¡i the sum of contributions by





Obviously, we can apply Proposition 3 within the (minimum) majority subset
fl;l+1;:::;ng. Hence, Proposition 1 also holds for the public good provision game
with a majority referendum.
Appendix B: Instructions 19
Thank you for participating in our experiment. In this experiment, you will make
decisions by which you can earn money. How much you will earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Please read these instructions
very carefully.
These instructions are for your private information. We kindly ask you to refrain
from any attempts to communicate directly with other participants. If you do have
any questions, please raise your hand and one of the persons who run the experiment
will come to your place and clarify your questions. In case you violate this rule, we
will have to exclude you from this experiment.
During the experiment, you can earn points, which will be exchanged for Euros
at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is 75 points for 1 Euro. At the
beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to groups of ¯ve participants. No
participant, but only the experimentors are able to identify the other participants
in
19This is our own translation of the German instructions for the MA treatment. Di®erences in
the UN and in the NO treatments are marked by footnotes.
19The decision task
We will inform you about the exact setting of the experiment later. In what follows
we describe the the general setting. Below the general descriptions you ¯nd a control
questionnaire, which will help you to understand the rules for the decision task.
You will be matched in groups of ¯ve players each. Each member of the group
has to decide how to invest 20 points. You can invest them for a private project or
you can invest some or all of them for for a public project. Each point which is not
invested in the public project will be automatically assigned to the private project.
Your income from the private project
For each point you invest for the private project you earn one point. For instance,
if you invest 20 points for the private project (and, thus, invest nothing for the
public project) you earn 20 points from the private project. If you invest 1 point
for the private project, you earn 1 point from the private project. Nobody except
you receives any income from your private project.
Your income from the public project
All group members earn for each point you invest for the public project as well as
you earn for each point any other group member invests for the public project. For
each group member, the income from the public project is as following:
income from the public project = sum of all investments for the public good £0:4
For instance, if all investments for the public good sum up to 12 points you and
each other group member earns 12 £ 0:4 = 4:8 points from the public project. For
instance, if all investments for the public good sum up to 2 points you and each
other group member earns 2 £ 0:4 = 0:8 points from the public project.
Your total income
Your total income is the sum of your earnings from the private project and your
earnings from the public project. Thus
your earnings from the private project
(= 20¡ your investment for the public project)
+ your earnings from the public project
(= 0:4£ sum of all investments for the public project)
= total income
Detailed instructions
In total, you will interact with the other participants for 2 £ 10 rounds. In each
round, you and four other participants will be matched in groups of ¯ve. For round
1 to round 10, you will interact with the same four group members. In round 11,
you will be matched with four other participants and interact with them from round
11 to round 20.
20Detailed description of each round
At the beginning of each round you and all other group members will be asked to
decide how many points you wish to invest for the public project. Thereafter, we will
inform you about the investments of all the other group members, and ask you to
vote for or against the public project. Your vote tell us whether you would like the
public project to be paid out according to the rule described above, or whether all
group members who invested in the public project will be reimbursed these points,
minus 1 point, for their private project.
If at least 3 members of a group vote for it, the public project will paid out
according to the rules described above. If three or more vote against the public
project, the total income in that round for all group members who invested 1 or
more points for the public project will be 19 points, while the total income in that
round for all group members who invested nothing for the public project will be 20
points.20
At the end of each round, you will be informed about the incomes and the
decisions of all group members.
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